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In examining children's moral orientations, the study draws on the work of Carol Gilligan
(1982) and Lawerence Kohlberg (1969) focusing on age and gender differences in moral
development. This study sought to examine children's moral reasoning about situations
involving conflicts and how they can resolve them. The present study is carried out in
order to ascertain whether children's choice of moral orientations varies across individual
factors such as age and gender. The study was conducted at a primary school in a
working class suburb in Pietermaritzburg, province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The
participants in the study were a group of 72 grade one and two learners. The participants
were randomly selected from an alphabetical class list stratified by age (6, 7 and 8 year
olds) and gender in that 12 boys and 12 girls were selected in each age group. The pupils
were required to respond to three scenarios depicting real life dilemmas. The scenarios
were used for obtaining data on the children's moral reasoning. Results have shown that
children across gender and age made more care than justice orientation compared to 30%
that reflected a justice orientation. An interesting finding was that across age boys'
responses reflected a more care orientation (68%) than a justice orientation (32%) which
is contrary to Kohlberg's view. However, across age girls' responses reflected a greater
care orientation (72%) than a justice orientation (28%), as suggested by Gilligan. Both
boys and girls showed a preference for the care orientation because they appear to
understand the importance of solving problems in a way that considers the needs and
concerns of all individuals. To understand the logic behind the learners determination of
who is right and wrong and why, it was necessary to locate and follow the moral
language, since the language gives meaning to the learners underlying belief system
(Ward, 1988). This study also examined the responses in terms of moral operant




1.1 Contextualising the study
1.1.1. What is moral development?
The entire concept of moral development must concern itself with child development and
how morality is acquired during the developing stages of life. There is considerable
debate as to how children acquire morality. Social learning theorists believe that children
learn morality by being rewarded or punished for various kinds of behaviour. According
to Pelaez-Nogueras & Gewirtz (1995) behaviourists focus on overt behaviour as the core
of psychological morality; for example, sharing, helping, and cheating. Psychoanalytic
models tend to focus on internalized societal norms for behaviour either conscience or
superego, and the corresponding emotions of self-reproach such as guilt and shame
(Gilligan 1977, Sagan, 1988). Cognitive theorists believe that, like intellectual
development, morality develops in progressive, age-related stages (Kohlberg, 1976;
Piaget, 1965).
The American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's (1927-1987) theory on moral
development and moral action has shown that moral deliberation alone is not sufficient to
ensure moral behaviour. A number of writers, including KoWberg (1984) have recently
argued (Rest, 1983) that morality is multi-faceted and that his theory captures one
component of morality, moral reasoning - the ability to arrive at a moral conclusion
regarding what a person ought to do. However, morality is more than the rational
determination of the moral ought; it involves also the ability to see that a situation has
moral dimensions. Rest (1983) calls this moral sensitivity. Morality requires that one
have the motivation to behave morally; often we call this moral character. However, in
order to behave morally the person must have the skills to determine a moral solution.
Morality includes a sense of justice, compassion, and caring about the welfare of others.
It also includes perspective-taking ability - that is, the ability to discern how someone
might be thinking or feeling. Children need to understand the reason behind rules,
especially rules relating to such moral concerns as justice, fairness, and other aspects of
human welfare. It is important to discuss the reasons why one behaviour is preferable to
another. When discussing contrasting behaviours with young children, the focus should
be on how what the child does affects someone else, for example, sharing crayons makes
a play partner happy while pushing the child away, makes the other child sad. Such
discussions foster empathy, higher levels of moral reasoning, and altruism (Berkowitz &
Grych, 1998; Wyckoff, 2000). These types of discussions also help children develop
perspective-taking abiUties in that they focus on how someone else might think or feel in
a given situation (Berkowitz & Grych, 1998, Wyckoff, 2000).
According to Kohlberg (1984), "following the rules" represents the first level of moral
reasoning - a level characterized by judgments being based on concrete, individual
perspectives and typical of how young children think. Children at this level are motivated
to follow the rules to avoid punishment and for to get rewards. Rules and procedures
should be established to protect the interests and rights of all children and that the reasons
behind these rules are shared with the children. The involvement of children in making
rules promotes their moral development and fosters their self-esteem (DeVries& Zan,
2003). Very young children may respond to seeing another child hurt as if they had been
hurt themselves. Children eventually become more and more able to imagine how other
people would feel in a given situation. As they develop perspective taking skills, their
sense of empathy develops as well. Children need to develop a sense of morality, as
caring about the welfare of others is critical to moral development.
1.1.2. Theoretical perspectives on moral development
This section focuses on the key theorists on moral development in children.
Piaget, a Swiss psychologist, explored how children developed moral reasoning. Piaget
(1932) rejected the idea that children learn and internalise the rules and morals of society
by being given the rules and forced to adhere to them. Through his research on how
children formed their judgements about moral behaviour, he recognised that children
learn morality best by having to deal with others. Piaget also reasoned that there was a
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process by which children conform to society's norms of what is right and wrong, and
that the process was active rather than passive. In his book, 'The Moral Judgement of the
Child' written in 1932, Piaget outlined his own theory of moral development. Piaget's
investigations began by exploring how children understood the rules of a game. The rules
of these games, argued Piaget, were handed down from one generation of children to the
next, in similar ways in which moral standards are handed down from adults to children.
Children's understandings of rules progress from comprehending at about age six that
rules are sacred and cannot be violated to a final stage at about age ten when they
understand that rules are the result of mutual consent among the participants in a game.
Piaget argued that games are important for moral development because they help children
to develop an understanding of how rules function, where they come from, whether they
can be changed and the consequences of changing rules.
After establishing changes in children's understanding of the rules of games, Piaget
proceeded to explore how children come to understand more specifically moral problems.
Piaget presented children with moral stories or vignettes involving moral dilemmas, and
questioned them. Piaget arrived at the conclusion that young children differ from older
children in the ways they think about moral issues. According to Piaget (1932), young
children are in a stage called morality of constraint. In this stage, children tend to think of
right and wrong in black and white terms. That is, an act is always right or always wrong.
The young child will define the rightness or wrongs of an act in terms of whether or not it
will evoke punishment. Children have a belief in immanent justice, the idea that some
punishment must follow a transgression.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1963,1981,1984) cultivated a theory of moral development, which
shared with Piaget's a sense in which moral reasoning is fundamentally a cognitive
process. Like Piaget, Kohlberg conceptualised morality as a system of social rules.
Kohlberg (1963) argued that our moral understanding is independent of social relations.
Kohlberg argued that children developed a sense of moral understanding specifically
through resolving cognitive conflicts within the individual's mind. Consistent with
Piaget, Kohlberg proposed that children form ways of thinking through their experiences,
3
which include understandings of moral concepts such as justice, rights, equality and
human welfare. Kohlberg followed the development of moral judgement beyond the ages
studied by Piaget, and determined that the process of attaining moral maturity took longer
and was more gradual than Piaget had proposed.
Kohlberg's work on moral development describes the increasing complexity with which
children reason about justice when responding independently to hypothetical dilemmas.
Kohlberg (1969) defined moral reasoning with regard to justice, and he assessed it by
analysing children's discussion of equality, fairness, and reciprocal rights. Though widely
respected and cited, Kohlberg's work has been criticised for its attention to only one
mode of reasoning, for its use of decontextualized hypothetical dilemmas, and for its
focus on moral thought rather than moral action.
Another key theorist on moral development in children is Sigmund Freud. According to
Freud (1932), the child acquires morality through the process of identification with the
same sex parent following resolution of the Oedipal or Electra complex. When the five-or
six-year-old identifies with the same-sex parent, she or he internalises the parent's moral
standards. At this point in psychosexual development, the child's superego emerges; the
superego acts as both a conscience (what not to do) and an ego ideal (appropriate and
desirable behaviours).
One controversial aspect of Freud's explanation of moral development concerns the
claim that girls develop weaker superegos than boys. In addition, little empirical support
exists for Freud's theory that guilt result in an internalisation of moral standards. Children
begin to show evidence of moral behaviour well before five or six years of age.
According to Erikson (1964) the morality of childhood is based on the fear of threats to
be forestalled. The outer fears are abandonment, punishment or exposure, the inner fears
are of guilt, shame or isolation. The development of a moral attitude also implies certain
forms of feelings where others have been treated unfairly or where self has violated
others rights or failed in responsibility to other persons. Feelings of shame are related to
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the failure to live up to one's self-ideal and identity (Richards, 1971; Thrane, 1979). Guilt
feelings thus become the basis for compensation and moral restitution to those who have
been treated unfairly and irresponsibly. Erikson's model draws on the theory of the
developing ego and the resulting virtues of the ego, which help guide moral action. The
ego develops as the child matures and becomes physically more competent and as society
presents new challenges and expectations. The child must learn to handle negative
feelings such as anxiety and fear and to control aggressive impulses; positive emotions
such as anger at injustice, and empathy and compassion must be acquired.
Using the above theories as frameworks, numerous studies were done in various contexts
examining moral reasoning in children. More recently, two theories of moral
development have been at the centre of dispute on this topic since the early 1980's, that
of, Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan (Lyons, 1983, Walker, 1989, Walker, Devries &
Trevethan, 1987). A model of moral development that has dominated the field of research
for over 30 years has been that of Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg's
perspectives have focussed on male development and a justice orientation, and it has been
argued that female development has been constructed as a deviation from the male
model. More recently, Carol Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982) proposed that women's life
experiences suggest different patterns of moral development for males and females,
departing from the work of Kohlberg. Gilligan argued that women's knowledge of the
importance of intimacy, relationships, and care has traditionally been minimised and
relegated to intuition not to development. The two moral orientations, not to treat people
unfairly and not to turn away from others in need, are manifested in the ways people
define and resolve moral problems. Numerous studies examined these theories from
different angles (for example, Beak, 2002; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Walker, de Vries
& Trevethan, 1987; Woods, 1996).
In South Africa empirical studies on moral development amongst children are limited. I
was able to locate one study by Muthukrishna, Rugo, Wedekind and Khan (in press)
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That sought to contribute to current research on variations within moral orientations of
children initially pointed to by Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. Data was obtained from a
group of children ranging in age from 9-13 years, 12 girls and 18 boys enrolled at an
urban primary school in Pieterrnaritzburg, South Africa. The participants in the study
come from diverse language, racial, religious, and ethnic groups. High levels of crime
and violence are prevalent in the working class communities in which the children live.
The children were requested to reflect upon two scenarios depicting real life dilemmas,
and then engage in moral judgements and decision making in response to probing
questions put to them in an interview situation. Results revealed that, contrary to
Gilligan's view, across age and gender the children's responses reflected a higher moral
orientation to justice than care. 65% of boys' responses show greater use of a justice
orientation in their reasoning than care orientation (35%). A similar trend was evident
with girls across the age ranges: 60% of girls' responses were justice oriented as opposed
to 40 % that were care oriented. An interesting finding was that girls' use of a justice
orientation increased with age and the use of moral reasoning that reflected a care
orientation decreased with age. However, in line with Gilligan's theory, boys' responses
across age ranges reflected a higher orientation to justice than to care. The findings
contribute to this increasing unraveling of what seemed to be an initially simple variation
in moral reasoning based on gender. They show a stronger tendency towards a justice
orientation within a community struggling with poverty and violence in a post
revolutionary society.
In my study presented in this dissertation, I examined closely children's moral reasoning
from the perspective of Kohlberg's morality of justice and Gilligan's morality of care. In
other words, my study focused on how these two moral orientations are manifested in the
ways children define and resolve moral problems. Therefore, the aim of this study was to
find out whether boys and girls use both orientations and anyone orientation to solve real
life moral dilemmas depending on the context of the dilemma and age.
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The study sought to examine children's moral reasoning about situations involving
conflicts and how they can resolve it. In addition, the study was carried out in order to
ascertain whether children's choice of moral orientations varied across individual factors
such as age and gender. How children think about right and wrong may be just as
developmental as how children think about letters and numbers. It was therefore
important to examine the young child's typical developmental progression of moral
thought in order to better understand how to link emerging morality to developmentally
appropriate practice.
1.2 Key Research Questions
The key research questions explored in this study were:
• Are there differences between age and gender in how morality is developed in
children?
• Does the children's age and gender reflect one orientation over another in conflict
resolution?
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature
2.1 Introduction
The literature reviewed in this chapter is mainly of research conducted internationally as
local research on children's moral reasoning appears to be very limited. The review
examines perspectives on the development of morality in children, and the major
theorists in this area of research. The literature review will also examine empirical
studies on moral development in children.
2.2 The development of morality in children
When defining morality, it has been somewhat of a theoretical mystery and many
theorists have attempted to label the process using various approaches that focus on
nature, social settings, cognitive abilities, and gender issues (Campbell-Bishop & Pina,
2004). Moral development is the process through which we develop proper attitudes and
behaviours toward other people in society, based on social and cultural norms, rules and
laws. "Perhaps because morality by its very nature, elicits such deeply felt convictions, its
study has been characterized by unique challenges and rampant controversy" (Arnold,
2000, p.365). These will be examined in this section.
Morality is viewed as the "system of rules that regulates the social interactions and social
relationships of individuals within societies and is based on concepts of welfare (harm),
trust, justice (comparative treatment and distribution), and rights" (Smetana, 1999, p.2).
This is how humans determine their actions based on their cognitive abilities to interpret
a social situation. Issues of reasoning, problem-solving skills, self- control and
adaptability are key components in the moral process. For some individuals issues of
values, personal feelings, and social norms are constructs for discussion, and therefore,
can be seen as being influenced by the way in which morality is taught or experienced in
schools, churches, and various other social settings.
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In order to fully understand the development of morals, one must consider the various
domains that exist within the morality framework. For many, it is seen as a part of nature,
others perceive it as a thought process; while others contend that it is a process of
behaviour development. From the naturalistic point of view, one sees moral development
stemrrting from a development perspective in that morality is conceived through how
children think, behave, and feel about rules and regulations set forth within their world as
a result of natural consequences (Lawerence & Hennig, 1999). The moral behavioural
approach contends that reinforcement, punishment, limitation, and situational
presentations are factors that contribute to the moral development in the human being.
Issues of self-control and cognitive capabilities play a key role in the moral behavioural
school of thought. All of these approaches connect to one assumption: factors such as
reasoning, problem-solving skills, self-control and adaptability influences moral
development but it is ultimately the environment that precipitates the acquisition of
morality.
There are several approaches to the study of moral development, which are categorized in
a variety of ways. Social learning theorists (Bandura, 1986) believe that children learn
morality by being rewarded or punished for various kinds of behaviour and by modeling.
Bandura developed the basic principles of observational learning in order to answer the
question: How we learn behaviour through observation of the behaviour of other people
who act as models? Freud a psychodynamic psychologist believed that morality develops
as a defense against anxiety over the loss of love and approval. Cognitive theorists such
as Kohlberg (1976) and Piaget (1965) believe that, like intellectual development,
morality develops in progressive, age-related stages.
Morality has to do with a sense of right and wrong, and with what psychologists call the
conscience. Piaget (1960), a famous cognitive psychologist, defined morality as "an
individual's respect for rules of social order and sense of justice," where justice is "a
concern for reciprocity and equality among individuals." According to Piaget (1960),
moral sense develops in two stages as follows:
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1) The moral realism stage is where all rules are obeyed without distinction. There is no
weight given in this first stage to intent.
2) The moral relativism stage is where rules are created and agreed to cooperatively by
individuals. In this second stage, rules can change-there is no absolute right or wrong.
Piaget (1960) classified children into one of the several categories based on their level of
moral development. Before two years of age, Piaget suggested that a child has no moral
rules but rather their behaviour is governed solely by motor abilities. They have no
understanding of social cooperation and everything is viewed from their wants and
desires. During the third year, the child begins to develop a sense of morality. Piaget
breaks this development up into two stages. In the first phase called morality of
constraint, children between about two and seven years of age are very rigid in their
beliefs of moral concepts. It is at this stage that the child is said to be egocentric because
they are not capable, according to Piaget, of taking someone else's perspective into
account, and so they are unable to use intention as a basis for understanding behaviour.
Children at this stage are "heteronomous", meaning they see moral rules as being
inflexible and behaviours as being either right or wrong (Duska and Whelan, 1975).
Those children see moral rules this way are grounded in the unilateral respect children
have for adult authority (Lapsley, 1996). After the age of seven, children gradually move
into the second phase, labeled the morality of cooperation. By developing equal
relationships with peers, children make the transition from heteronomy to autonomy by
being provided with a social environment that encourages them to work cooperatively
together, changing rules through mutual consent. This stage is characterized by flexibility
in that the child realizes that rules are not absolute and can be changed. Also, the child
develops the ability to take multiple points of view, enabling them to make moral
judgments based on the intent behind the behaviour.
Piaget was perhaps the first to delve into the thought processes behind children's moral
decision-making (Piaget, 1965). While Piaget was not so concerned with what the child
decided, he was interested in how the child arrived at the decision. In his wisdom, Piaget
observed children playing games, told them stories involving moral dilemmas, and
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questioned them. He arrived at the conclusion that young children differ from older
children in the ways they think about moral issues. The child's individual level of
cognitive development, enhanced by informal interactions with other children,
determines how the child characteristically thinks about right and wrong. Though
Piaget's work was done many years ago subsequent investigations have generally
supported his findings.
A number of researchers (Kohlberg 1963; 1984; Damon, 1977; Turie!, 1983) have argued
that Piaget's claim that heteronomous reasoners see adults as infallible authority figures
is simply incorrect. Laupa and Turiel (1986) argue that young children do not show
unilateral respect for adult authority figures. For example, when asked whether an
immoral action would be acceptable if an adult condoned it, young children often said
that it would not (Laupa, 1991). However, Laupa's results did show some of the features
of heteronomy and in particular the non-differentiation of adult authority attributes,
amongst the younger children in her studies.
A further criticism of Piaget' s theory is that it is based in an ethnocentric and gender-
specific conception of morality. For example, Weinreich-Haste (1982) argues that Piaget
bases his conception of morality too much around concepts of rules and rationality and
that these, in turn, were more in keeping with a "male" notion of morality. In a similar
vein, Buck-Morss (1975) argues that Piaget's emphasis on questions of epistemology and
the development process runs the risk of neglecting the importance of social and cultural
influences in development. Given the importance of authority and social relations in
Piaget's theory, these social aspects of moral development do indeed deserve a degree of
scrutiny that Piaget did not give them.
A psychoanalytical approach presented by Freud investigates the development of self
through the id, ego, and superego and the various conflicts that arise during stages of
moral development. According to Freud, we are born with our id. The id is an important
part of our personality because as newboms, it allows us to get our basic needs met.
Freud believed that the id is based on our pleasure principle. In other words, the id wants
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whatever feels good at the time, with no consideration for the reality of the situation.
When a child is hungry, the id wants food, and therefore the child cries. When the child
needs to be changed, the id cries. When the child is uncomfortable, in pain, too hot, too
cold, or just wants attention, the id speaks up until his or her needs are met. The id does
not care about reality, about the needs of anyone else, only it's own satisfaction.
Within the next three years, as the child interacts more and more with the world, the
second part of the personality begins to develop. Freud called this part the ego. The ego is
based on the reality principle. The ego understands that other people have needs and
desires and that sometimes being impulsive or selfish can hurt us in the long run. It is the
ego's job to meet the needs of the id, while taking into consideration the reality of the
situation. By the age of five, or the end of the phallic stage of development, the superego
develops. The superego is the moral part of us and develops due to the moral and ethical
restraints placed on us by our caregivers. Many equate the superego with the conscience
as it dictates our belief of right and wrong.
In a healthy person, according to Freud, the ego is the strongest so that it can satisfy the
needs of the id, not upset the superego, and still take into consideration the reality of
every situation. This is not an easy job by any means, but if the id gets too strong,
impulses and self-gratification take over the person's life. If the superego becomes to
strong, the person would be driven by rigid morals, would be judgmental and unbending
in his or her interactions with the world (Freud, 1932).
The key within Freud's theory is how the child identifies with the parental figures,
caregivers and teachers in the way in which conflicts during those developmental years
are solved by the child through the various aspects of the development of the self.
Through this process the development of the conscious is constructed and becomes a
focal point for future behaviours.
Freud (1930) proposed that our sense of moral duty arises from our relationships with our
parents. The importance of this relationship is a result of the parents' role as principal
caregivers and as sources of comfort, support, and security-or, as Freud puts it, as love
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objects. However, when a child does something that his or her parents disapprove of, the
child is punished. This punishment leads to feelings of frustration and anger in the child
and parents become objects of hate.
In the early years punishment acts as an external form of control exercised by parents.
Over time this external form of control becomes internalized. However, the child does
not usually enforce this internal form of control by means of self-punishment. Rather,
when a child does something wrong he or she feels guilt which acts as the principal
mechanism for internalized self-control. To avoid guilt, or self- punishment, the child is
motivated to act morally and in accordance with the mother or father's moral standards.
Identification with the punitive parent therefore leads the child to adopt the moral
standards and principles of that parent-the parent's superego. Thus moral rules move
from external to internal forms of control, and a child adopts the moral standards of his or
her parents.
However, Freud's theory has, generally, been criticized not only for the lack of empirical
evidence but also because many aspects of the theory are difficult to test. For example,
Freud claims that external control leads to feelings of guilt which, in turn, motivate the
child to act morally. Thus whilst evidence has generally supported the proposition that
children reflect the moral values of their parents (Walker &Taylor, 1991) it is difficult to
determine whether Freud's account, or other socialization accounts, are the best for
explaining this process.
Erikson (1964) created a theory of psychosocial development describing the stages each
person passes through emotionally, socially, and personally. He highlights five important
ideas concerning the basic needs of all humans, the response to those needs in the form of
development, the stages involved in development, the motivation reflected in the
progression through the stages, and the challenges each stage presents. Erikson lists eight
stages ranging from infancy to old age, each with its own hurdles to be overcome and
needs to be met. Erikson's theory is vital as it pinpoints the struggles learners' face
socially and emotionally at different times.
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Erikson (1964) defined eight developmental stages during which a crisis must be resolved
in order for a person to develop psychosocially without carrying forward issues tied to the
previous stages. During the infancy stage (the first year of life), he proposed that the
primary crisis to be resolved is one of trust versus mistrust. Erikson labeled the task to be
resolved during the second year- of-life (toddler stage) as autonomy versus shame and
doubt; the preschooler age (years 3-5), as initiative versus guilt; and the elementary
school stage, competence versus inferiority. As the children move into adolescence, he or
she must refine his or her sense of identity versus role confusion; in young adulthood,
intimacy versus isolation, in middle adulthood, generativity versus stagnation; and in
older age, integrity versus despair. According to Erikson (1964), as the individual
negotiates a crisis at each stage of development, basic strengths or virtues emerge. The
following are the eight basic virtues that Erikson believed emerged across psychosocial
development: hope, will purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom,
respectively.
Erikson's (1964) view of the development of one's identity is very important in the
overall development of people. To guide children's psychosocial development, we should
pay great attention to the crises Erikson described as occurring during the first 18 years of
life. For example, during the infancy stage, parents are the primary care givers who see
that the basic needs of the child are met. Food, shelter, and proactive efforts at comforting
the infant lead it to hold a basic trust about the world. When children's needs are not met
at this critical early stage, an imbalance of mistrust results and set the stage for a basic
mistrust of the environment and those in it.
As children continue to grow and become toddlers, they grapple with issues of autonomy.
If encouraged to explore age- appropriate and accomplishable tasks, they will develop a
heightened sense of autonomy, for example, children who assert their independence, by
walking away from their mother, picking which toy to play with, and making choices
about what they like to wear, to eat etc. If children in this stage are encouraged and
supported in their increased independence, they become more confident and secure in
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their own ability to survive in the world. If children are criticized, overly controlled, or
not given the opportunity to assert themselves, they begin to feel inadequate in their
ability to survive, and may then become over dependent upon others, lack self-esteem,
and feel a sense of shame or doubt their own abilities.
Between the ages of 3-5 (the preschooler stage), children attempt to find the balance
between striking out on their own (initiative) and fearing to do so (guilt). As adults, it is
important to encourage early efforts at self-initiating behaviour (Erikson, 1964). For
example, if young children indicate a willingness to pursue activities, either independent
of their parents or just beyond their previous successes, parents need to encourage the
behaviour. If children do not learn it is acceptable or advisable for them to initiate
acti vi ties on their own, then they learn to feel guilty.
From age six years to puberty, the child's psychosocial crisis is competence versus
inferiority. In this stage the children begin to develop a sense of pride in their
accomplishments. They initiate projects, see them through to completion, and feel good
about what they have achieved. During this time, teachers play an increased role in the
child's development. If children are encouraged and reinforced for their initiative, they
begin to feel industrious and feel confident in their ability to achieve goals. If this
initiative is not encouraged, if it is restricted by parents or teachers, then the child begins
to feel inferior, doubting his or her own abilities and therefore may not reach their
potential.
According to Erikson (1964), during adolescence, a primary aspect of developing one's
identity deals with role confusion. The transition from childhood to adulthood is most
important at this stage. Erikson (1964) stated that the adolescent mind is essentially a
mind of the moratorium-a psychosocial stage between childhood and adulthood (i.e., the
morality learned by the child and the ethics to be developed by the adult). Children are
becoming more independent, and begin to look at the future in terms of career,
relationships, families, housing, etc. During this period, they explore possibilities and
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begin to form their own identity based upon the outcome of their explorations. This sense
of who they are can be hindered, which results in a sense of confusion.
Erikson (1964) proposed that an identity is rooted in the very core of one's being,
involves being true to oneself in action, and is associated with respect for one's
understanding of reality. Work in the area of developmental models of self-identity has
suggested that identity includes some elements of the ideal self and functions as the ideal
principle of action (Blasi, 1984, 1993). Blasi (1984) argued that people's moral identities
could vary in content. This means that whereas one person may see being compassionate
as central to his or her moral identity, another may emphasize being fair and just. Blasi 's
(1984) analysis suggests that even though there may be several non-overlapping moral
traits that compose each unique person's moral identity, there exists a set of common
moral traits likely to be central to most people's moral self-definitions.
Blasi's (1984) second assertion is that being a moral person may be but need not be a part
of a person's overall self-definition. This means that the ideal of being a good or moral
person may occupy different levels of centrality in peoples' self-concepts. This assertion
does not necessarily contradict Erikson's (1964) view that identity is rooted at the very
core of one's being; rather, it suggests that having a particular identity is not an either-or
proposition. Instead, the self-importance of a given identity may change over time (Hart,
Nelson, Robinson, Olsen & McNeilly-Choque, 1988), and, consequently, so too might its
motivational strength. Although the self-importance of one's moral identity may change,
what remains central to Blasi's (1984) view is that in the absence of a strong moral
identity, the ability to execute complex moral judgments and present moral arguments is
not necessarily a required antecedent of moral behaviour. The primacy of moral identity
in motivating moral conduct was more strongly asserted by Damon and Hart (1992), who
stated that "there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the centrality
of morality to self may be the single most powerful determiner of concordance between
moral judgment and conduct.
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A model of moral development that has dominated the field for over 30 years has been
that of Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg (1981) envisaged moral
development as emerging parallel to the development of reason. He paid more attention
to development from school age onwards. Like Piaget, Kohlberg equated the moral
domain with the concept of justice. Kohlberg saw the relationship between self and
society's rules, roles and expectations as primary to moral development. He identified
changes in people's understanding of justice by studying their responses to hypothetical
dilemmas. Kohlberg presented his subjects with a number of hypothetical situations
involving moral questions like the following. If a man's wife is dying for lack of an
expensive drug that he cannot afford, should he steal the drug? If a patient who is fatally
ill and in great pain begs for a mercy killing, should the physician agree? By analyzing
the answers and particularly the reasoning by which his subjects reached their answers.
Kohlberg determined that moral judgments develop through a series of six stages.
Kohlberg used his longitudinal study of males to generate a three level model of pre-
conventional, conventional and post-conventional moral reasoning, with two stages in
each level. Lickona (1976) describes the six stages of justice, the central issue in
Kohlberg's concept of morality. Lickona (1976) holds that a person's view of justice
permeates his approach to solving all moral conflicts and defining human rights and
obligations. He agrees with Kohlberg that the concern for justice, like thinking about
other moral issues, is given a new and wider definition at each higher stage. The stages
are explained as follows:
The first level, the pre-conventionallevel the child is concerned with avoiding
punishment and getting needs met.
Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation. The child is handed down a fixed set of
rules, which he or she must unquestioningly obey.
Stage 2. Individualism, instrumentation, and exchange. At this stage children recognize
that there is not just one right view that is handed down by an authority figure. Different
individuals have different viewpoints.
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The second level is called conventional. Children in this level are concerned about being
accepted by others and living up to their expectations.
Stage 3. Good interpersonal relationships. At this stage children who are by now usually
entering their teens see morality as more than simple deals. They believe that people
should live up to the expectations of the family and community and behave in a good
way. Good behaviour means having good motives and interpersonal feeling such as love,
empathy, trust and concern for others.
Stage 4. Social system and conscience. Children and adults at this stage abide by the rules
of the society in which they live. These laws and rules become the backbone for all right
and wrong actions. Children and adults feel compelled to do their duty and show respect
for authority. This is still moral behaviour based on authority, but reflects a shift from the
social group to society at large.
The third level is called post-conventional. During this level individuals govern their
behaviour by the relative values and opinions of the groups they live and interact with.
Right behaviour is based on a social contract.
Stage 5. Social contract and individual rights. The validity of universal moral principles;
awareness of the social contract between individuals, but also of the different moral
perspectives of others; some individual right, however, transcend the different
perspectives of others and, should be upheld.
Stage 6. Universal/ethical principals. Is what Kohlberg describes as a "second-order
conception of Golden Rule role-taking". This means that one wants to uphold a personal
commitment to universal self-chosen moral principles (Kohlberg, 1973).
In summary, Kohlberg describe three levels of moral development, which describe the
process through which children learn to discriminate right from wrong. In the early level
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of development, children strive to maximize pleasure and avoid punishment. Children at
this level consider the needs of others only to the extent that meeting those needs will
help the child fulfill his or her own needs. During the next period, which is characterized
by conformity to social rules, the child demonstrates respect for and duty to authority.
The child also seeks to avoid disapproval from that authority. As the child matures, his or
her moral judgment is motivated by respect for legally determined rules and an
understanding that these rules exist to benefit all. Eventually, universal principles are
internalized. These principles, such as liberty and justice, may even transcend aspects of
the existing legal system.
Kohlberg also sometimes spoke of change occurring through role-taking opportunities to
consider others viewpoints. As children interact with others they learn how viewpoints
differ and how to coordinate them in cooperative activities. As they discuss their
problems and work out their difference they develop their conceptions of what is fair and
just. Whatever the interactions are specifically like they work best, Kohlberg said when
they are open and democratic. The less children feel pressured simply to conform to
authority the freer they are to settle their own difference and formulate their own ideas.
Lickona (1976) further points out that Kohlberg states that from a psychological
standpoint the higher stages are better because they are more equilibrated, more capable
of handling diverse moral conflicts within their problem-solving framework. From a
philosophical standpoint, Kohlberg maintains that each higher stage does a better job of
measuring up to the long-standing criteria of reversibility, consistency and universality.
Puka (1989) argues that the moral dilemmas presented by Kohlberg are too artificial to be
a real test of peoples' capacity for moral reasoning. In every day life moral dilemmas are
more complex, and do not allow time for or opportunity for such an approach. Often we
have to act immediately and there are no ethical rules that regulate morality in every day
life situations. Besides, moral judgments do not necessarily correlate with behaviour.
People may exercise their judgment at the highest level of moral development; yet still
act immorally (Damon 1988, Malinowski & Smith 1985).
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After considering the influence of moral development theorist, one must begin to
combine how each theory comes into play when looking at the real world of an emerging
child. Morality is a part of a complicated reciprocal process that manifest within a social
setting through interaction while conserving self identity (Smetana, 1999). Social
interactions can be difficult to understand because within society there are not set rules
therefore conceptualization of rules, uniformities, and behaviours can be conventions that
are difficult for a child to interpret without some type of assistance.
2.3 Moral Development: Beyond Kohlberg
Carol Gilligan is an American feminist ethicist and psychologist best known for her work
with and against Lawrence Kohlberg. In 1970, Gilligan was a research assistant for
Lawrence Kohlberg. In outrage and despair of the lack of attention given to women and
girls in psychological research, she began to study and research women's development.
During the past 20 years, Gilligan has contributed to research on adolescence, moral
reasoning and conflict resolution. Gilligan (1982) who came to be known as the founder
of 'difference feminism' claims that women have different moral and psychological
tendencies than men. Based on her research, Gilligan suggests that men think more in
terms of rules and justice, and women are more likely to think in terms of caring and
relationships. She argues that society should begin to value both equally.
Gilligan (1982) challenged Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. Pointing out
the bias inherent in his original sample, Gilligan argued that Kohlberg had not included
the perspectives of women. Kohlberg's theory of moral stages has been a predominant
factor in the exploration of morality since his early longitudinal studies of young boys.
Gilligan proposed that women's unique life experience and its impact on their
development are not considered in what Kohlberg claims is his universal model of moral
development. Women, when measured on Kohlberg's scale, rarely reached the higher
stages of moral reasoning, and most often seemed to demonstrate stage three reasoning,
that of helping and pleasing others. In Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development, the
male view of individual rights and values were considered at a higher stage than women's
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view of development, in tenus of its caring effect on human relationships. According to
Kohlberg the highest stages of moral development (fifth and sixth stage) can only be
derived from an objective reflective understanding of human rights and social justice.
Based on her research, Gilligan critiques this by arguing that the psychology of women is
distinctive in that it is more oriented towards relationships, interdependence, and a strong
sense of responsibility to the world, and therefore a more contextual kind of judgement
and a different moral reasoning. Therefore, women order human experiences in tenus of
different priorities.
Gilligan's (1982) research showed that women tended much more often than the men to
see morality in tenus of care rather than justice, in tenus of responsibility rather than
rights. Whereas men see things as moral issues where they involve competing claims
about rights, women see problems as moral when they involve the suffering of other
people. Whereas men see the primary moral imperative as centering on treating everyone
fairly, women see that moral imperative as centering on caring about others and about
themselves (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Men typically make moral decisions by
applying rules fairly and impartially, whereas women are more likely to seek resolutions
that preserve emotional connectedness for everyone (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988).
Similarly, men tend to look back and to judge whether a moral decision was correct or
not by asking whether the rules were properly applied, whereas women tend to ask
whether relationships were preserved and whether people were hurt. The quality of the
relationships, rather than the impartiality of the decisions, is the standard for evaluating
decisions for women.
Gilligan (1982) reproaches Kohlberg for only paying attention to justice in his theory of
moral development. A justice perspective draws attention to problems of inequality and
oppression and values an ideal of mutual respect. Because of this, she argues, Kohlberg
neglects the 'care' aspect of morality. Care is, according to Gilligan, a feminine way of
judging. Since Kohlberg reconstructs all moral development in tenus of justice, little or
no light is shed on the moral development of women. Consequently, Gilligan devised an
altemati ve model of development.
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Within the last two decades, an alternate framework has been presented by Gilligan
(Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988) that raises
challenges to Kohlberg's view of moral orientation as based solely on the principles of
rights and justice. She argues for two moral orientations (rather than stages) in the
understanding of the social world: (leading to equality of rights and fairness), and a care
perspective (leading to attachment, responsibility, dependency and loyalty). Gilligan and
her colleagues suggest from their research that issues of care, compassion and concern for
others and an interest in preserving interpersonal relationships reflect another equally
valid orientation.
A moral orientation, according to Gilligan, represents a conceptually distinctive
framework or perspective for understanding the moral domain. In her understanding of
adolescent real-life experiences, Gilligan argues that Kohlberg's theory is insensitive to
females' moral thinking, and girls are poorly represented in terms of moral development
when their moral orientations are examined solely in terms of justice. In her theory,
Gilligan claims that it is not always possible to remain objective and impartial towards
those who violate rights and are unfair. Gilligan also argues that Kohlberg downplays the
care model in favour of the justice response. In view of this, she argues for the expansion
of Kohlberg' s theory to incorporate a woman's perspective. The focus of her
methodology is on care and compassion for others, the ability to find unique solutions
involving moral conflict, and also in the maintenance of relationships. Gilligan argues
that males and females differ in their basic life orientation, particularly in their
conceptions of morality. Males view morality as involving issues of conflicting rights,
and females view morality as involving issues of conflicting responsibility. In other
words, males typically have a justice or rights orientation, and females have a care or
responsibility orientation.
However, although the theories appear to be distinct from each other, there appears to be
some congruence between the moral orientation delineated in the models of Kohlberg and
Gilligan's. In Kohlberg's model males correspond to the normative orientation because of
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their presumed focus on rights, duties and justice. Females on the other hand, have a
perfectionist or utilitarian orientation because of their focus on relationships, caring and
welfare. In defence, Kohlberg argued that the care mode of moral reasoning is reflected
in the utilitarian and perfectionism orientation that is synonymous with Gilligan's model.
Kohlberg's (1984) hypothetical dilemmas were an integral component of his interview
method, and offered high inter-rater reliability in use of the research instrument. Gilligan
claimed that these hypotheticals presupposed a definition of morality as justice and were
biased towards justice- based resolutions. In contrast, Gilligan used open- ended
interview questions about real life dilemmas. By describing an experienced moral
dilemma, the participants were able to define morality in the context of their own lives.
Rather than being given a predetermined moral dilemma and asked to resolve it, the
participants described in detail the components of their own reasoning in a situation
where they felt a moral conflict. While Kohlberg suggested that Gilligan's morality of
care was insufficient to resolve certain justice dilemmas, Gilligan (1982, 1988)
emphasized that what constituted a moral dilemma varied between orientations.
According to Gilligan, the very process of defining a moral conflict was critical to
understanding an individual's moral reasoning (Gilligan et aI., 1982). It was this
methodological approach which enabled Gilligan to "hear" the voices of women and men
describing their own experience of moral conflict.
Further, in his studies Kohlberg's (1984) hypothetical dilemmas involve content that is
removed from children's experience and concerns, and not all children are able to think
of or discuss a significant real life moral issue problem. These hypothetical dilemmas
may elicit a justice response, that is, normative and fairness orientations. Real life
dilemmas, on the other hand, elicited a care response related to the utilitarian and
perfectionist orientation.
What is clear is that over the last quarter of a century, the initially simple insight of
Kohlberg into a hierarchy of moral stages has been shaken as other variables and contexts
entered the debate. The first and most obvious variable thanks to Gilligan has been a
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focussing in on gender differences. The results of several studies with adolescent and
adults show conflicting findings (Lyons, 1983; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Walker,
1989; Walker, Devries & Trevethan, 1987, Enomoto, 1998, Vera & Levin, 1989; Hinke,
1997; Katz et.al., 1999; Garrod et.al., 2003; Gump et.al., 2000). Gilligan & Attanucci
(1988) and Lyons (1983) found that women were more likely to focus on issues of care
and concern when talking about real life dilemmas, whereas men have a tendency to
focus on the justice and fairness views. Walker (1989) and Walker et al (1987) found few
consistent gender differences in moral orientation. In engaging with these conflicting
findings, Walker et.al (1987) argue that the use of hypothetical dilemmas may be
irrelevant or unfamiliar and as such may minimize the individuals' identification and
emotional involvement with the task. 10hnston (1988) found in studies using the 'fable
task' that female adolescents described concerns about relationships more often than
males when asked to talk about real life dilemmas.
Pratt, Golding, Hunter & Sampson (1988) suggest that gender differences appeared to
reflect the different types of real life problems that were likely to be experienced by men
and women. In other words, the social experiences of males and females differ in
everyday life, and may explain the nature of the moral experiences they relate. Yet these
findings have been complexified by studies that show both men and women using the
care modality over the justice modality (Vera & Levin, 1989), depending on the level of
importance and degree of difficulty of the problem. This makes sense, the more important
a case is to a person, the more one cares about it and the greater the level of difficulty the
more problematic it becomes to use clear cut justice orientations.
Gilligan argued that women's voices and experiences had been left out of theory
building, but she did not claim that all women would articulate similar moral reasoning.
This "different voice" does signal the potential for differences in moral reasoning
emerging from differing social and psychological experience, including experiences
associated with gender and race.
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In Gilligan's recent research, she continued to pursue a series of empirical investigations,
concentrating increasingly on the development of adolescent girls, including their moral
development. Indeed, one of the disturbing things (from the Kohlbergian standpoint) was
that girls wanted to talk about the situation. They asked questions, looked for more
details, tried to find hidden alternatives, etc. As a result, their responses often did not fit
the framework established by Kohlberg. These girls were, in effect, offering a different
view of moral discourse. Kohlberg's view was that the moral discourse was about taking
a position and giving reasons in support of it. Gilligan's respondents were telling her that
ethical discourse had a different form: it was primarily a conversation, an interchange.
2.4 Empirical Studies on moral development in children
Internationally numerous studies have been conducted to examine the claims made by
Kohlberg and Gilligan about children's emerging morality. The data that exists are drawn
from American and British studies, which when compared to the South African context,
remains far more affluent and therefore social experiences are vastly different. In this
section, a review of these studies is undertaken.
Nazar (2001) conducted a study to determine the moral reasoning of preschool children
from the State of Kuwait on the dimensions of moral realism and justice of Piaget's
morality. Specifically, the following research questions were addressed in this study. To
what extent preschool children at the ages of five and six use intention and outcome
information in judging other's deeds? Are there differences between boys and girls in
both judgments in terms of motive and magnitude of physical damage (intrinsic-
extrinsic dimension)? To what extent preschool children use equality or authority or
obedience justification in their judgment about justice? Are there gender differences in
making judgments about justice issues Uustice- dimension)? The moral realism stories
used in this study dealt with the child's ability to consider subjective intention when
making moral judgments about clumsiness or stealing. The justice stories contained
questions involving equality versus authority. Coloured drawings were used to draw the
children's attention to the presented stories and to render the task more understandable
and more concrete. The subjects were 108 preschool from kindergartens. They were
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equally divided into gender and age: 27 boys and 27 girls aged 5 years; and 27 boys and
27 girls aged 6 years (mean age =53). All the children were Muslim from the State of
Kuwait. Four moral items were chosen for the study. They consisted of a pair of short
stories patterned after Piaget's clinical method (1932) to assess the children's moral
realism; and two moral items dealing with justice. The moral realism stories deal with the
child's ability to consider subjective intention when making moral judgments about
clumsiness or stealing. The justice stories contained questions involving equality versus
authority.
After a brief contact with each child to establish rapport, the researcher interviewed the
children individually. Prior to assessing the subjects' moral judgments, they were asking
to recount the pair of stories in their own words. The answers were transcribed verbatim
for further analyses. The scoring of the responses to the moral stories was done on the
basis of a scoring system similar to the one presented by Lourenco (1991). Responses
were classified according to the outcome of an act, or the intention of an act (stories
1&2); and according to the justification for fairness of an act (stories 3 & 4). Percentages
of answers for each category were calculated on the basis of their frequencies.
The results of the study revealed that the subjects' moral judgments were made
predominantly in terms of intrinsic motives. The findings of this study seem to support
the assumption that children around the age of five years judge an actor who had no bad
motives, not to be bad, although he had unintentionally caused damage. The children base
their judgements on the criterion of a match between an actor's motive and the outcome
of his action (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). In the study preschool children made
judgements in terms of both intrinsic motivation and the amount of physical damage.
Piaget contends that moral judgment begins to be made at the age of six or seven after a
year of socialisation in school.
The study conducted by Nazar (2001) showed that the results by chronological age are
quite consistent with Piaget's theory that suggests that immature moral judgments reflect
centering on consequences while disregarding intent. In contrast, mature responses reflect
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recognition that both intent and consequence are important in solving moral dilemmas
(Foye and Simeonsson, 1979). Thus, older children (6years) made more significant
judgments in terms of intrinsic motivation than younger children (5years). On the other
hand, younger children made more significant judgments in terms of magnitude of
physical damage. This finding corroborates research that suggests that chronological age
substantially influences moral development in children (Johnson 1962; Ozbek and
Forhand 1973).
The findings that boys develop moral judgment earlier than girls were not consistent with
Piaget's (1932) suggestion because of differential demands of peer cooperation. Gender
differences in moral development have always been an issue of debate in the research. A
lot of inconsistent statements have been made regarding the effect of the gender on moral
development (Huston 1983; Lytton and Romey 1991). Children in this study, however,
attended kindergarten schools, which may have enhanced the socialisation process and
hence the early emergence of their moral judgment. A common feature in Kuwaiti
schools concerns the social atmosphere that seems conducive to children's moral growth.
Concerning the children's judgments on the issue of justice, the results shown in the
study indicated that the majority of the children clearly indicated the idea that it was not
fair to treat children unequally. The children all responded in terms of equality. The data
indicated that the children begin to give up their moral realism and to make judgments
consistent with the notion of justice, equality well before the age of seven. Piaget
reported, by means of stories similar to the ones used in this study that about 75 per cent
of the children of 5 to 7 years defend obedience; and about 80 per cent of the children
between 8 and 12 years defend equality (Piaget 1932, p.268). The present finding is not
consistent with Piaget" original findings. This may be due to the early socialisation
process of the preschool children in the sample. Only nine children responded in terms of
obedience. They identified what is just with what is in conformity with obedience. This
finding illustrates well the differences of children's judgments as a function of sex. All
the girls reported that the mother was fair in the story because she said so
(authority/obedience). This result may be interpreted in terms of socialisation processes
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in Muslim families where it is stressed that girls should be more obedient than boys. This
finding also illustrates that the issue of gender differences in moral judgment might be the
result of many factors. It is differentially influenced by social-cultural environment, and
hence the inconsistent findings reported in the literature concerning this issue (Smetana
1981, 1985; Smetana and Braeges 1990). A major finding of this study is that Piaget's
time-line for moral development of Muslim Kuwaiti children apparently does not hold.
Instead, children in this study had greater moral reasoning ability at a younger age than
children in Piaget's study.
A study conducted by Peisach and Hardeman (1983) examines the responses of young
children to questions concerning their reasons for not lying and stealing. First graders'
responses to questions designed to elicit their reasons for moral obligations were analysed
within the framework of a two-dimensional system: child characteristic and context.
Child characteristic was represented by the variable of sex, context by the nature of the
prohibited act: lying versus stealing.
The sample consisted of 144 first-grade middle-socioeconomic children attending five
public schools in a New York City suburb. First graders' responses to questions designed
to elicit their reasons for not lying and stealing were analyzed in terms of Kohlberg's
stage theory. In the study, the results suggested that children, like adults, might perceive
stealing as a more serious crime than lying. The findings of the study do not support the
use of Kohlberg's theory for the understanding of young children's moral reasoning.
According to the theory, six-year-old children would be expected to exhibit
predominantly stage 1 responses. The data in the study show that in responses to
questions concerning why it is wrong to lie or steal only 16% of the total number of
responses could be classified as stage 1, and only about 10% of the children consistently
gave such responses. The question may be raised as to whether a cognitive stage theory is
appropriate for understanding the moral reasoning of young children.
In his study on children's moral reasoning about family and peer violence, Astor (1994)
found that both the approval and disapproval of violence were justified by moral
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reasoning. This inquiry examined violence in family and peer situations. The subjects
included 108 children evenly divided among grades 2, 4, and 6 (mean ages = 8-1,10-2
and 12-2 years, respectively). The children were selected from two San Francisco Bay
Area inner city schools in the USA were asked to evaluate unprovoked and provoked
violent situations. Each age or grade group was composed of 18 violent and 18
nonviolent children. Therefore, the study had a total of 54 violent children and 54
nonviolent children. The children in the violent group were selected on the basis of the
frequency and salience of their violent acts during a two- month period. The second,
fourth and six-grade teachers, teacher assistants and principals of the school kept a tally
or log of the violent transactions of the children in these grades. Only violent acts were
recorded (as defined by Straus et al., p.20) to distinguish between the "acting-out"
children who's behaviour included lying, vandalism, stealing, and verbal aggression from
the violent children who caused physical harm to others. The children were enrolled in
two San Francisco Bay Area inner city schools in the USA. All the children in the sample
came from families with incomes below the poverty line.
Each child received a 40-min structured interview task pertaining to violence. Each child
was presented with short vignettes depicting family violence and peer violence, and then
asked to evaluate the described situations. The interviewer and subjects had no
knowledge of the violent / nonviolent status of the children interviewed. Furthermore, the
subjects had no knowledge that the study was comparing the responses of 'violent' and
'nonviolent' children. The interviews were tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed.
It was found that all children in the study negatively evaluated each of the four
unprovoked situations. Furthermore, almost all of the children used moral justifications
for each of the scenarios. The most frequently used justifications for all four stories were
concern for the physical welfare of the victim and the wrongful intent of the perpetrator.
In addition, the large majority of children identified unprovoked violence as a violation of
social rules. All the children reasoned that the social rules against unprovoked hitting
existed for moral reasons (i.e. to prevent physical harm). All the children condemned
unprovoked violence using moral reasoning. With provoked situations, the violent group
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focused more on the immorality of the provocation and perceived "hitting" worse than
the psychological harm of the provocation and condemned the violence. The results
suggest that both the approval and disapproval of violence were justified by moral
reasoning. It was proposed that the violent children's greater focus on psychological
provocations might be due to experiences and self- perceptions of victimization.
Some implications emerged from the data in this study. First, both approval and
disapproval of violence were justified primarily by moral reasoning. Therefore, research
and interventions based on an assumption that violence results from an absence of
morality may be based on a false assumption. Research on violence should explore the
apparent vital role of moral reasoning for the approval of violence.
Finally, this study has several limitations. It is possible that the children's responses to
these hypothetical situations did not reflect how they might actually respond or how they
would evaluate observed situations. This should be examined in future studies that obtain
children's reasoning about real life situations (i.e. after a fight between peers on the
playground). Future studies should track children and compare reasoning about violence
with actual occurrences of violence similar to the vignettes. Until this type of research is
conducted, the results of this study are limited to violent and nonviolent children's
reasoning about hypothetical violent situations.
A research study by Ward (1988) presents data from a group of urban adolescents in a
large public high school in Boston who reflect upon their own real-life experiences with
violence, a topic which is central to their lives and a central concern to society- at- large.
An Alternative Program (a pseudonym) was created in the school administration's
attempt to restructure the large, impersonal and unsafe environment. As a requirement of
the Alternative Program, all students had to take part in a yearlong course that grapples
with moral issues raised by current events. The course 'Facing History and Ourselves:
Holocaust and Human Behaviour', addresses both history and human behaviour. The
intention of the course was to bring the terrible events of this catastrophic tragedy in
modem history out into the open where they can be examined. It was believed that the
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adolescents in reflective questioning about themselves and the social and moral world in
which they live would ultimately reduce psychological and physical violence in schools,
homes, and communities.
In contrast to the many studies that focus on teens that commit violence, this research
focuses on the ways in which violent behaviour is judged and explained by adolescents
who have not been adjudicated delinquent or engaged in criminal behaviour, but who
must live in the midst of frequently occurring incidents of violence. Thirty-seven
adolescents drawn from a tenth- grade class that was about to take the Facing History
course were interviewed. Later, an additional fourteen students were interviewed as well.
All but eight of the students were interviewed twice. At the end of the two interviewing
periods, a total of seventeen males and thirty-four females (N=51) had been asked a
battery of questions. The Alternative Program population was primarily black, white, and
Hispanic, with a small number of Asian students. The majority of the teens participating
in this program are from low to moderate-income Boston families.
The study applies the concept of different moral orientations to descriptions of real- life
violent events. The violence questions were included in a larger interview protocol that
asked the students open-ended questions about moral conflict, choice, self-perception and
change, and unfairness. The data analysis for this study looked closely at the responses to
the violent questions. The violence questions were included in a larger interview
protocol, which asked the students open-ended questions about moral conflict, choice,
self-perception and change, and unfairness. Students were asked, "Tell me about a violent
situation, or situation in which someone was being hurt" following the description of the
violent event, the students were asked, "Why do you think this happened?" and following
their reply, "Do you think the people involved were right or wrong in what they did?"
Many of the students who, in addition to their responses to the violence inquiry, recalled
violent episodes when being questioned about personal moral conflict, situations of
unfairness, and times in which they made a decision not to speak up. After careful
scrutiny, a total of ninety-three violent events were determined to be codable for the
analysis. Thus, it was necessary to create an expanded analytical framework with coding
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categories of justice and care, and combined categories of both and integrated. These
categories, empirically derived from the real-life stories of violence and moral conflict in
the lives of urban adolescents, represent an analytic distinction not made in previous data
analysis.
In the findings, the violent events reported were embedded in a narrative of human
relationships that had gone awry. Students described an astonishing array of violent
episodes ranging from face slapping to three separate incidents of murder. Generally, the
violence involved physical attacks against another person (e.g. beatings, muggings, use of
weapons, rape, battery and assault). Occasionally students chose to relate an event which
involved psychological attack or pain (e.g. neglect, verbal abuse, intensive arguments,
"brainwashing") and when this occurred, the student made it clear to the interviewer that
in their opinion this action was a form of violence.
In the study, urban adolescents' understanding of the violence that surrounds them had
been identified and elaborated. Students were found to use moral language in their
explanations and justifications of violence and they made thoughtful judgments about
those who participated in violence events. Central to the task of illuminating these
understandings of violence were concepts of justice and care as moral orientations. These
organized the structures upon which judgments were made.
A study by Knox, Fagley, and Miller (2004) assessed the moral orientations of African
American college students. One hundred and ninety-two Mrican American students at a
historically Black university were asked to complete a questionnaire. The research tool
used was the MOS (The Moral Orientation Scale). The MOS is an objectively scored,
quantitative measure of adult moral orientation based on the theoretical models of both
Kohlberg and Gilligan. The two care-oriented follows twelve dilemmas frequently faced
by children and two justice-oriented possible objective responses (in a random order) that
participants are asked to rank in order. Instructions ask respondents to imagine that they
have an 8-to-lO-year-old child and that they are helping their child decide what to do in
each situation.
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In the findings the absence of gender differences is not consistent with the prediction of
Gilligan's theory of moral development. Means for men and women were virtually
identical. Given that the power to detect a medium sized difference was over 90%, the
study suggests that if there are gender differences in moral orientation among African
American students, the difference must be small. This finding is reasonably consistent
with the meta-analysis of gender differences in moral orientation conducted by Jaffee and
Hyde (2000). They concluded that, although there was a gender difference, it was small
and it provided only modest support for the arguments made by Gilligan that men are
predominantly justice oriented and that women are predominantly care oriented. It is
important to remember, however, that most of the studies Jaffee and Hyde (2000)
reviewed were conducted with white samples, and ethnicity was not included as a
variable. Results demonstrate that African American College students predominantly
exhibit a justice moral orientation. These results are consistent with Gilligan and
Attanucci's (1988) and Coon's (1997) assertions that minorities, in this case African
American undergraduates, would endorse more of a justice orientation in their moral
reasoning (Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988; Coon, 1997). Basically, the reasoning is that
people whose rights are often violated and who experience unfair treatment by others
would be more likely to develop an emphasis on justice, fairness, and individual rights.
2.5 Concluding comments
Justice and care orientations in moral thinking have been the subject of extensive
discussion, and both can play a significant role in moral reasoning. Gilligan et al. (1988)
claimed that girl's moral reasoning, like women's, would reflect commitments to
preserving and nurturing relationships rather than commitments to principles (such as
justice) that men and boys would favour. Researchers have since debated the legitimacy
of splitting along gender lines a justice perspective from a perspective based on caring
(Walker et al., 1987; Baumrind, 1986; Walker, 1989). Some researchers argue that we
make moral decisions from both justice and care orientation depending on the need and
context of the case and depending on background beliefs and culture, what Charles
Taylor (1989) calls our moral horizons. In a number of studies, boys and girls seem
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almost equally disposed to solving the problem from either perspective, with both sexes
indicating a 'slight preference for solutions involving the care orientation' (Beal et aI.,
1997). In other studies differences between the reasoning of adolescent boys and girls are
evident along the lines that Gilligan predicted (Baurnrind; 1986) with girls often
indicating preference for solution in real life dilemmas based on an ethic of care (Skoe &
Gooden, 1993).
These findings raise the question of whether or not the sex difference that is sometimes
evident in moral orientation is due to the differing types of moral dilemmas that female
and males encounter. This is not to deny that the choice and construal of a dilemma may
reflect one's orientation. However, the social experiences of males and females differ in
everyday life and may explain the nature of the moral dilemmas they relate.
From an analysis of the literature my own perspective is that while I believe both Gilligan
and Kohlberg have developed sound theories about how morality may develop, both are
polarized views, which restrict their positions in a nearly sexist manner. To say that all
males and females reason in only one way is to assume that gender roles are fixed, and
negates other conditions, which may display differences. Whilst much research on moral
orientation has sought to identify the relatively abstract conceptual structures, which
underpin moral judgments, relatively little has sought to examine the ways in which
moral judgments and decisions are made in real life. There are, however, good reasons
for examining the ways in which more "everyday" judgments are made. Not only is it
important to learn something more of the social and cultural context in which moral
thought is embedded but it is also crucial to explore moral decision-making in real life.
Therefore in the proposed study I will examine closely whether boys and girls use either
orientations or anyone orientation to solve real life moral dilemmas depending on the
context of the dilemma.
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CHAPTER THREE: Research Methodology and Design
3.1 Introduction
The present study tries to explore whether there are age and gender differences in the
moral reasoning of young children. Given the exploratory nature of this study, a
qualitative methodology was considered the most suitable method to be used. This
chapter locates the study within an interpretivist paradigm. The chapter explores the
social construction of childhood in relation to emerging morality in boys and girls. The
chapter then describes the context of the study, participants in the study, procedures of
data collection, method of data analysis and ethical considerations.
3.2 A Qualitative Methodology
Qualitative research designs have become increasingly important modes of inquiry for
the social sciences. Qualitative methods permit the researcher to study selected issues in
depth and detail (Mouton and Marais 1988, Patton 1990). Most researchers, for example
Banister, Parker, Taylor and Tindall (1994) and Denzin and Lincoln (1994) agree that
one undertakes qualitative research in a natural setting where the researcher is the
instrument of data collection, who gathers words or pictures and analyses them. Tuckman
(1994: 46) defines qualitative research as "detailed study, thick description, enquiry in
depth, direct quotation capturing people's personal perspectives and experiences".
According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994) qualitative researchers stress the socially
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is
studied, and the situational constructs that shape inquiry such researchers emphasize the
value-laden nature of inquiry. The researchers seek answers to questions that stress how
social experience is created and given meaning. As a qualitative researcher, I needed to
be closely involved with learners in the school.
Research involves collaboration with the participants whose native perceptions and
meanings are valued in a consultative and a co-constructing process. Qualitative research
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therefore embarks on the researchers' self-reflective awareness of his or her
constructions, which demands a high degree of reflexivity on the part of the researcher.
This meant that I had to reflect on my own values and biases.
3.3 Locating the study
An interpretivist approach was most appropriate for my study on moral orientation since
it aimed to understand whether there are age and gender differences in children's moral
reasoning. The interpretive paradigm seeks to understand how children make sense of
their social world. The interpretive paradigm is concerned with understanding the world
as it is. The interpretivist paradigm aims to understand the subjective world of human
experience (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2000). Interpretivism views the social world
from subjective experiences of individuals. The interpretivists focus on action. An action
only becomes meaningful when we understand the intentions. Glaser and Strauss (1967)
cited in Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) states that interpretive researchers set out to
understand the subjects' interpretations of the world around them. In the interpretive
approach the researcher does not stand above or outside, but is a participant observer
(Carr & Kemmis, 1986), seeking to discern the meanings of actions as they are expressed
within specific social contexts. The interpretivist researcher's task is to understand




The social construction of childhood as outlined by lames and Prout (1997) formed the
theoretical framework of my study. Childhood is seen as a negotiated process where
children are active in constructing their own social world, and interpreting the meaning of
that world and its significance in their personal lives. Children are seen as social actors
and childhood as a particular kind of reality. Willis (1990) see children and young people
as creators and social actors who are active in creating themselves in different social
contexts. lames and Prout (1997) suggest that there is a shift away to an emphasis on
structure to that of agency where children are recognised as children in their "own
rights". Children are, therefore, aware of what they want and their role in achieving their
goals and the need for and adult "agent" to gamer their needs and speak on their behalf
has been reduced drastically or is not necessary. Mayall (1996) argues that this approach
accepts children as competent reporters of their own experiences, takes them seriously,
and places their views at the center of analysis enabling research to work for the children
rather than on them. lames and Prout (1997) argue that childhood is a distinct,
intrinsically interesting, and important phase in human experience. Children are fully
formed and complete individuals with perspectives of their own. They are autonomous
subjects and they are recognised as having rights of their own, including the right to
protection from harm and the right to voice opinions, and influence decisions in matters
relating to their own lives.
Traditionally, it is developmental psychology, which has explained the nature of children.
Freud and major cognitive psychologists Erikson and Piaget, all characterised childhood
development as an orderly, linear progress from incompetence to competence i.e.
adulthood (Mason, 1993). The concept of development is linked to the biological facts of
immaturity such as dependence to social factors. While most critics accept that physical
immaturity of children is a biological fact of life, lames and Prout (1990), argue against
the positivist reliance on biology. In actual fact, as Morrow (1995) argues, physical
dependency diminishes during the period typically regarded as childhood. It is replaced
with socially determined dependency, based on economic, social and cultural factors.
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Developmentalists, such as Kohlberg, propose that the process of attaining moral
maturity occur over time if conditions are favourable for such growth. They also believe
that a child's moral maturity is directly related to the way he or she thinks about concepts
such as justice, rights, equality and human welfare. Over time and through a variety of
social interactions, children come to develop their own understandings of these concepts.
Thus, their sense of "goodness" is constructed through their own thinking about their
experiences and through dialogue with others about what these experiences mean (Nucci,
2001). Children's sense of goodness is also fostered through encouragement offered by
significant adults in their lives.
Kohlberg's theory of moral development builds on Piaget's work, which focused
primarily on cognitive development. According to Piaget (1965), children construct and
reconstruct their knowledge of the world through interactions with the environment. Such
knowledge includes children's understandings about what is right and what is wrong
(Piaget, 1965).
According to the constructivist theory of development in children, these central aspects of
moral functioning cannot be given to children but they can be fostered. The constructivist
model of moral development suggests that we should avoid giving children a list of do's
and don'ts to guide their behaviour. Yet we all know that children must learn to act in
certain socially acceptable ways to get along well in society and to maintain a healthy
sense of self.
Children are active in the construction and determination of their own lives. We can no
longer talk about children. We have to talk with children and listen and recognise that
listening is an active, emotional and interpretative activity. The powerlessness of
children, and the difficulty children have in being heard in which their attempts to speak
out and voice their wishes and opinions have been and continue to be ignored. Rayner
(1991) says that children are a large uninfluential section of the community. They do not
have access to the means of exerting power or protecting their own vulnerability. They
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are restricted in the extent to which they can make decisions about their own lives. The
concept of the child as people in their own right involves the child in issues that affect
them. Hardman (1973) attempts to give voice to children, as people to be studied in their
own right. But should children have any 'rights' anyway? Or more specifically, if they
do, what should those rights be? First, moral argument as Hardman suggests that children
are human beings, so they should have rights. The constructionist approach to childhood
draws strength from a contemporary ethical view that all humans should be treated
'equally' .
Gilligan suggests remapping the individual's development to include two dimensions
which characterize all human relationships: inequality / equality arid detachment /
attachment (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988). She argues that the experience of the child as
being unequal in the adult world on the one hand, and striving for attachment in order to
survive on the other, is universal and paves the way for two moral orientations in the
understanding of the social world. One orientation is that of justice (leading to equality),
and the other is that of care (leading to connection and attachment). Whereas the justice
perspective reflects a focus on fairness, equality of rights, and independence, the care
perspective focuses on connection and responses.
The regulation of childhood occurs mainly within institutions of family and school. It is
internationally recognised that the school has an important part to play (Gutmann, 1995).
Many institutions and factors will influence and shape the development of value systems,
but all agree that school, colleges, and universities have an extremely important role to
play in supporting the development of valve systems. Steyn (1999) suggests that children
should be educated in the home and the school so that they can develop the virtues of
concern for individual autonomy, justice and free inquiry. By educating the children in
having morals, educators contribute towards building a society in which ethos prevails.
Consequently the school has a critical role to play in this respect. Children, youth,
adolescents and adults spend most of their educative years in educational institutions.
Therefore school is the ideal place for the transfer of the norms, morals, and ideals which
society sees as fitting.
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3.5 Context of Study
The study was conducted at a primary school situated in a working class suburb in
Pietermaritzburg, province of Kwazulu - Natal, South Africa. The school is situated in a
historically disadvantaged and predominantly working class and lower middle class
community with a strong Christian ethos. A co-educational public school with a
population of 1100 learners. The majority of the learners are African and the Coloured
learners making up about 40% of the total population. The children attending the school
do not all live in the immediate neighbourhood but come from as far as fifteen to twenty
kilometres. The children are transported to school by their parents and private minibuses
or taxis. Hence the buzzing of activity before the start and close of the school day.
The classes are from Grade R through to Grade 7. There is also remedial class for slower
learners who need individual attention. The language of instruction is English. The school
also offers a myriad of extra- mural subjects for learners namely: Judo, computer classes,
choir, debates and drama.
The school fees for the current year are set at R450. Non-payment of school fees is a
matter of concern, as many of the learners from low-income families cannot afford to
pay. This impact on the effective running of the school.
3.6 Participants in the Study
The participants in the study were a group of 72 grade one and two learners. The
participants were randomly selected from an alphabetical class list stratified by age (6, 7
and 8 year olds) and gender in that 12 boys and 12 girls were selected in each age group.
The information about age and gender were taken from the school records. Hence
purposive sampling was used to ensure that both sexes and the three age groups were
represented equally in the sample for study. The basic assumption behind purposive
40
sampling is that with good judgement and on appropriate strategy, the population
elements can be handpicked so as to suit the needs of the researcher.
3.7 Data Collection Methods
The pupils were required to respond to situated scenarios, or stories, that reflect a moral
dilemma. The aim was to "elicit perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes from
responses or comments to the stories, or scenarios, and situations" (Barton and Renold,
1999:2). The scenarios were used for obtaining data on the children's reasoning. A
scenario is a carefully constructed description of a particular situation under
investigation. The purpose of the scenarios was to convey an idea or situation about
which children make judgements and answer questions.
Scenarios were used to explore the children's ethical frameworks and moral codes. For
example, the scenarios were used to explore the ethical frameworks informing children's
thinking about issues such as moral reasoning. The use of scenarios also removed some
of the pressures of being interviewed, creating a more informal, relaxed atmosphere for
the children.
The scenarios were developed taking into account the context of the lives of the
participants. This research involving South African children, most of who live in
relatively hostile climates and have been exposed to many situations in which their rights
may have been restricted unfairly. It seems reasonable to suggest that children who have
experience these kinds of severe conditions may view moral dilemmas involving rights
differently from relatively advantaged children. It also seemed possible that children who
have lived in a climate of hostility, political violence and conflicts might think differently
about scenarios involving real life moral dilemmas which would be more realistic and
perhaps closer to the children's own experiences.
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TABLE ONE: SITUATED SCENARIOS
Scenario One:
One day after school Peter and Brandon were arguing. They go to the same school. I stopped and listened. This is what
the fight was about. Two weeks ago, Brandon begged Peter to lend him RiO because he was hungry and wanted to buy
chips from the school tuck shop. Peter gave him the money. Brandon promised to return the money on the next day.
Peter told Brandon that the money was his brother's money-his brother asked him to keep the money for him. His
brother wanted to buy pens for school with the money. It was now two weeks gone by-Brandon kept on hiding from
Peter-and Brandon still did not return the money. Peter was very angry. He caught Brandon after school, and was
shouting at him, and threatened to beat him/hit him. Brandon was also shouting at Peter-saying that he would return the
money one of these days.
Questions:
1. What do you think happened in this story?
2. Was what Brandon did right?
3. Was it right that Peter wanted to hit Brandon?
4. Is there any other way in which Peter could have got his money back from Brandon?
5. When do you think it would be OK to hit someone?
6. Should we help people like Brandon? Why?
Scenario Two:
John is 20 years old, and lives with his parents. Next door lives the neighbour Themba and his family. John loves
music and everyday he plays his music very loud. John says that he can only enjoy his music when it is very loud.
When the people walk past John's house, they can hear the "Boom", "boom", "boom" from the road. Many times
Themba complained about the noise to John and John's father-but the father said that John loves music and he cannot
stop him from doing what he likes. Yesterday, Themba came from work very tired-he heard the loud noise of the music
and got very angry. He rushed to his garage, took a big stick, and went over to John's house. There was a big argument.
John kept on saying that his music was not loud, and that it was good music. Themba threatened to break the sound
system in the house and beat up John.
Questions:
1. What happened in this story?
2. Was John right in what he did? Why?
3. What did Themba do? Is it right what Themba did?
4. Should Themba have behaved in such a way? Why?
5. How can two people make things right? What can they do to be friends again?
6. Themba wanted to hit John. When is it okay to hit someone?
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Scenario Three:
Mala and Rita are in the same class. One day Mala wanted to borrow Rita's ruler and Rita said that she cannot lend her
the ruler as she is afraid that the ruler may get lost. The next day Rita was leaving the classroom to go outside. It was
break time. As she reached the stairs, Mala pushed Rita from behind, and Rita fell down three steps. Rita was hurt and
began crying. Mala just stood there and laughed at Rita.
Questions:
I. What do you think happened in this story?
2. Was Mala right or wrong in what she did? Why?
3. Was Rita right or wrong in what she did? Why?
4. How would you have felt if you were their friend and saw what happened? Why?
5. When is it okay to hurt someone like this? Why?
6. What would you say to Mala and Rita to make things right? Why?
Or can they be friends again.
Given the above context of childhood in South Africa, there are sound reasons for
examining the ways in which children make everyday moral judgements and engage in
moral decision making.
3.8 Research Procedure
Each child was interviewed for approximately 20 minutes. Each interview was based on
two tasks in which children had to listen to scenarios depicting real life dilemmas, and to
respond to questions based on the scenarios. The questions to elicit the children's moral
orientation were included in a larger protocol, which asked the students open-ended
questions about moral reasoning, choice, self- perceptions, and violence. The questions
were asked during individual interviews, and the researcher probed to clarify responses
and to encourage elaboration.
The teacher read the scenarios and pictures were used to draw the children's attention to
the presented scenarios and to render the task more understandable and more concrete.
The children were first asked to explain the scenario to ensure that the event was fully
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understood, and then to respond to the questions. Interviews were audio - taped, and later
transcribed for scoring.
3.9 Data Analysis
Through a process of content analysis, children's moral orientations were examined
within and across the two dilemmas. Using the transcripts, firstly, responses across both
the dilemmas were independently examined to identify moral judgements, and then they
were coded for the orientational logic that they represented. The coding procedure used
was adapted from Beal, Garrod, Ruben, Stewart & Dekle, (1997), Johnston (1988) and
Ward (1988). Children's responses were classified as showing orientation to
care/concern for others, or an orientation to justice/rights.
Searching for the conventional hallmarks of justice and care began data analysis. Justice
as a moral orientation has fairness as its moral objective. Responses that were judged to
invoke rules or refer to duty, fairness, and taking advantage of unequal power or issues of
personal rights, norms, standards or obligations were coded as operating from justice
logic when a moral judgement was made. The care orientation focussed on ways to
maintain the relationships between the individuals, concern that individuals may get hurt,
be harmed, experience pain, or experience psychological or physical suffering, or aim to
promote the welfare of all involved.
The data did not fit neatly into only these two categories. Some of the statements
combined considerations of justice as well as considerations of care. These formulations
were categorized as "both". In the category 'Both' statements that contained both a care
concern and a justice concern are present and each moral statement could be coded and
counted separately. The "integrated" category is unique in that both justice and care
considerations and judgments must occur together in the same statement. The final
category "uncodable" includes statements that do not offer enough information to be
reliably coded.
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The data was further analyzed in terms of moral operant concepts which is defined as the
ideas, beliefs, or principles that are used to organize a moral orientation (Ward, 1988).
For a moral judgement to be coded as operating from the justice orientation, statements
had to include one, or more, of the following ideas:
Justice Logic Requirements
1. Violation of a person's rights
2. Violation of standards of behaviour
3. Violation of a principle
4. Violation of fairness
a. taking advantage of unequal power
b. undeserved punishment
5. Violation of the "Golden Rule"; doing something to others that one would not want
done to oneself.
For a judgment to be coded as operating from the care orientation, one or more of the
following ideas has to be expressed:
Care Logic Requirements
1. Attention called to hurt, pain, or suffering (both physical and psychological).
2. Violence seen as wrong because it could have been avoided through dialogue.
3. Attention to the effect of harm to the victim as well as harm that came to others from
seeing the victim harmed.
4. Attention called to a lack of care determined to be morally wrong.
Care logic could support violence under the following conditions:
5. Violence seen as wrong because people get hurt but violence seen as sometimes
necessary.
3.10 Ethical Considerations
Ethical issues were taken into consideration when conducting my research. Written
permission was sought from the Department of Education, the school principal, parents,
and caregivers who were informed of the nature of the research. A letter was sent home
to parents of all children who were selected for this study. The letters were in English and
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IsiZulu to ensure that all parents could access the information. The parents signed the
letters to signify approval of the child's participation in the research. The interviewees
were satisfied that their identity and any information that they provided were in all
circumstances treated as confidential. A decision not to participate had not resulted in any
form of disadvantage. All subjects' participation was totally voluntary and was free to
withdraw from the study at any stage and for any reason. The nature and purpose of the
study was explained to them and informed consent was obtained before the children were
interviewed.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the research methodology and design of the study were
presented. In this chapter, data that was collected through interviews are presented and
analysed. The study examines whether there are age and gender differences in the moral
reasoning of young children.
4.2 Findings of the Study
4.2.1 Analysis according to justice vs care orientations
Across the three scenarios, participants made 930 statements that depicted some moral
orientation, 237 (30%) were statements that supported ajustice orientation and 554
(70%) a care orientation. The other two categories 'unintegrated' and 'uncodable'
comprised 139 (15%) of the responses. There were 31 responses that fell into the
unintegrated category and 108 in the uncodable category. The responses that fell in the
"Both" category were counted twice (46 responses - 46 justice and 46 care) and allocated
to both justice and care.
An analysis of the data revealed that it was possible to identify the distinctions in moral
orientations proposed by Gilligan (1982) in responses of the children in the study.
Gilligan (1982) claimed that men are more "justice" oriented while women are more
"care" oriented. The most common justice orientations were: duty, fairness, taking
advantage of unequal power, attention to undeserved punishment, issues of personal
rights, norms, standards, rights, obligations, and child protection. The most common care
orientations were: maintain relationships between the individuals, engage in
communication and dialogue, concern that individuals may get hurt, be harmed,
experience pain, or experience psychological or physical suffering, or aim to promote the
welfare of all involved.
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Examples of responses illustrating justice orientation and care orientation
(Scenario 1)
Care orientation examples
Peter should have told his parents to intervene. His parents would speak to
Brandon 's parents and sort out the problem. (girl,6yrs) (maintain the
relationships between the individuals)
No. Peter should ask very nicely to get the money backfrom Brandon. (boy,6yrs)
(engage in communication, dialogue)
It is not right to hit Brandon in any given circumstances because he will get
hurt. (boy, 7yrs) (empathy)
Peter can phone Brandon 's mother and tell her. Brandon will be forced to pay
back the money. (girl, 8yrs). (maintain the relationships between the individuals).
Justice orientation examples
No, because ifyou steal no one can help you. (boy,8yrs) (norms ofsociety).
No, because ifPeter lend Brandon the money, he must give Peter back the money
because Peter is doing him afavour by lending him the money. (girl, 8yrs) (duty)
No, because Brandon need to pay Peter back ifhe owed him money. (girl, 7yrs)
(obligation)
Peter should lay a complaint against Brandon at the police station. Because
Brandon does not want to pay back Peter's money. (girl,6yrs) (standards, norms)
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4.2.2 Moral orientation by age and gender
There are interesting trends with respect to age and gender that emerged in the data (see
Table 2).
The combined responses reflected a greater care orientation than a justice orientation
across gender and age. 70% of the responses reflected a care orientation, and 30%
reflected a justice orientation.
Overall, across age boys' responses reflected a more care orientation than a justice
orientation, contrary to Kohlberg's view. 68% of the responses by boys reflected a care
orientation compared to 32% that reflected a justice orientation. Furthermore, the
findings for boys did not go according to Gilligan's view. The boys use of a care
orientation increased with age from 61 % in the 6- year age group to 64% in the 7 -year
age range and 74% in the 8-year age group.
Peter could have told his mother that Brandon took his money or they could have
talked about it. (boy, 6yrs). (engage in communication, dialogue).
No, hitting another person is not right. Fighting is not good because people who
fight get hurt. (boy, 7yrs) (empathy)
Apologize and Peter could have said sorry for threatening Brandon. Then he could
have got his money back. (boy,8yrs) (maintain the relationships between the
individual)
Peter could have just asked Brandon nicely for the money without fighting and he
Could have given the money back. (boy, 8yrs) (engage in communication,
dialogue)
However, across age girls' responses reflected a greater care orientation (72%) than a
justice orientation (28%), as suggested by Gilligan.
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Table 2: Number of Moral Orientation Responses by Age Range and Gender *
Age Gender Justice Orientation Care Orientation Total
Boys(n=8) 26 (39%) 41 (61 %) 67
6 yrs
Girls(n=9) 35 (35%) 65 (65%) 100
Total 61 (37%) 106 (63%) 167
Boys(n=13) 48 (36%) 87 (64%) 135
7 yrs
Girls(n=13) 44 (29%) 108 (71 %) 152
Total 92 (32%) 195 (68%) 287
Boys(n=12) 44 (26%) 127 (74%) 171
8 yrs
Girls(n=12) 40 (24%) 126 (76%) 166
Total 84 (25%) 253 (75%) 337
Total across Boys(n=33) 118 (32%) 255 (68%) 373
Gender
Girls(n=34) 119 (28%) 299 (72%) 418
Total
statements 237 (30%) 554 (70%) 791
made
*adjustedfor the "Both" category.
The girls' use of a care orientation increases with age, which was consistent with findings
suggested by Gilligan. In the 6- year age group, 65% of the girls' responses reflected a
care orientation, while in the 7-year age range, 71 % of the responses by girls suggested a
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care orientation and in the 8- year age group 76% reflected a care orientation. With
respect to girls, Gilligan predicted an increase in care orientation for girls as they grow
older (Gilligan, 1982).
However, in both age groups they were more care orientation, with an increase in care
orientation with age. In fact, the results indicate a decrease in justice orientation with age.
In the 6- year olds, 37% of responses reflected ajustice orientation, the 7-year olds 32%
of responses reflected a justice orientation, and in the 8-year olds 25% of responses were
justice oriented.
The learners choose solutions embodying the care perspective as the best way to solve
their dilemma. Because each person identifies a moral problem for him or herself, the
real-life dilemma task allows for the expression of reasoning that reflects the moral
orientation of concern for others as well as the self, and the goal of preserving important
relationships. The analysis showed no effect of child gender: boys and girls were equally
likely to suggest solutions that embodied the care orientation.
Overall, the present results converge with other findings to suggest that boys' and girls'
reasoning about moral problems appear initially similar in childhood, even though their
experiences growing up as male or female have been quite different (Walker, De Vries, &
Trevethan, 1987; Walker, 1989; Langdale, 1993; Beal, 1994). The growing evidence for
gender similarity in childhood presents a challenge to the suggestion that early
differences in patterns of attachment might lead to differences between males and
females in notions of relationships and moral orientation (Beal, 1994). The possibility
that males are socialised early to adopt a more individualistic, detached perspective on
moral problems does not fit well with the present findings indicating that both boys and
girls showed a large and consistent preference for the care orientation. Thus, early in
development, both boys and girls appear to understand the importance of solving
problems in a way that considers the needs and concerns of all individuals.
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4.2.3 Analysis according to moral operant concepts
This study also examined the responses in terms of moral operant concept, which is
defined as the ideas, beliefs, or principles, that were used to organize a moral orientation.
The idea here was that the content of the moral consideration was organized into a
structure upon which judgments were made (Ward, 1988). The conceptual framework as
outlined by Ward (1988) would be used to analyze the data in this study. Across the three
scenarios, participants made statements that depicted some moral orientation. To
understand the logic behind the learners' determination of what is right and wrong, it was
necessary to locate and follow the moral language used by the participants. For example,
121 (49%) of males and 87 (51 %) of females in the study made statements that reflected
a greater attention to hurt, pain, or suffering (both physical and psychological) across age.
The most common care orientations were: maintain the relationships between the
individuals, engage in dialogue, communication, concern that individuals may get hurt,
be harmed, experience pain, or experience psychological or physical suffering, or aim to
promote the welfare of all involved; and the most common justice orientations were:
duty, fairness, taking advantage of unequal power, attention to undeserved punishment,
issues ofpersonal rights, norms, standards, rights, obligations, and child protection. The
data analyses for this study first analyzes responses in terms of the care operant concepts,
and secondly according to the justice operant concepts.
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Table 3: Number of Care Operant Concepts by Age Range and Gender
Care Operant Concepts A Gender
g Care Orientation
e Male Female Male Female Total
Attention called to hurt, pain, 6 n=8 n=9 7 (22%) 25 (78%) 32
or 7 n=13 n=13 54 (61%) 35 (39%) 89
suffering (both physical and 8 n= 12 n= 12 60 (48%) 66 (52%) 126
psychological).
Total 121 126(51%) 247
(49%)
Violence seen as wrong 6 n=8 n=9 13 (37%) 22 (63%) 35
because it could have been 7 n=13 n=13 34 (62%) 21 (38%) 55
avoided through dialogue. 8 n =12 n=12 40 (49%) 42 (51%) 82
Total 87 (51%) 85 (49%) 172
Attention to the effect of harm 6 n=8 n=9 nil 2 2
to the victim as well as harm 7 n=13 n=13 2 nil 2
that came to others from 8 n =12 n =12 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 5
seeing the victim harmed.
Total 6 (67%) 3 (33%) 9
Attention called to a lack of 6 n=8 n=9 12 (44%) 15 (56%) 27
care determined to be morally 7 n =13 n=13 24 (53%) 21 (47%) 45
wrong. 8 n =12 n=12 19 (58%) 14 (42%) 33
Total 55 (52%) 50 (48%) 105
Violence seen as wrong 6 n=8 n=9 nil 1 1
because people get hurt but 7 n=13 n=13
3
nil 3
violence seen as sometimes
necessary. 8 n =12 n =12 5 (62%) 3 (38%) 8
Total 8 (67%) 4 (33%) 12
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In this study the combined responses reflected a greater attention to hurt, pain, or
suffering (both physical and psychological) across gender and age. 51 % of the girls'
responses reflected attention to hurt, pain, or suffering as a care orientation as suggested
by Gilligan compared to 49% of the boys.
Many of the learners interviewed organized their thoughts around the notion that the
violence described caused someone to suffer and that this hurt, pain, or suffering (both
psychological and physical) is intrinsically wrong and I or morally problematic. While
violence itself most often implies hurt, pain, and suffering, there were learners who
formulated their moral judgments exclusively around these concerns, and they were
coded as care orientation.
Mala did a wrong thing because she pushed Rita on the steps. Rita can get
injured. (girl, 6yrs)
Wrong, Mala pushed her down the stairs and she can hurt herself. (boy, 7yrs
Themba went to his garage and took a stick to hit John. No, he is going to hurt
him. (girl, 8yrs)
Mala hurt Rita and pushed her down the stairs. (boy, 8yrs)
The second most common insight of the care perspective is that violence is unnecessary
and through dialogue, it can usually be prevented. Overall, across gender and age 51 % of
the boys and 49% of the girls saw violence as wrong because it could have been avoided
through dialogue.
Peter should have told his parents to intervene. His parents would speak to
Brandon 's parents and sort out the problem. (girl, 8yrs)
Brandon should give Peter his money back and apologize for the delay. (boy, 7yrs)
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Mala can apologize to Rita for what she did so that they can stay as friends. (girl,
6yrs)
Violence was perceived as wrong because it was seen as unnecessary, since it could have
been avoided through dialogue and its companion, listening. The notion of talking as a
move toward mediating violence was seen as the key to preventing a violent event.
Attention to the effect of harm to the victim as well as harm that came to others from
seeing the victim harmed. The learners who use care logic express deep concern when
others were allowed to suffer needlessly.
J will feel sad because they don't have to fight. (boy, 8yrs)
J would have felt bad because they suppose to be friends. (girl, 8yrs)
The learners also expressed dismay as they consider the harm that violence cause to
others who witness the event.
Attention called to a lack of care determined to be morally wrong. Overall, across gender
and age 52% of the boys and 48% of the girls responses reflected attention called to a
lack of care determined to be morally wrong.
The loud music distracted Themba and he couldn't go to sleep. He needed to rest
so that he can go to work the following day. (girl, 7yrs)
No, he was selfish and did not think that Themba was tired and he wanted to
sleep. (boy, 8yrs)
The care logic can be judged as morally problematic especially those actions, which
would cause or allow someone to suffer unnecessarily.
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Violence seen as wrong because people get hurt but violence seen as sometimes
necessary. The care logic could support violence under the following conditions:
a) Belief that people involved saw no choice, violence was the only way they could
protect themselves and others that may have been endangered.
b) Violence was an understandable response by persons who had suffered a history of
lack of care or abuse.
It was interesting to note that 67% of the boys indicated that the violence was justifiable.
Themba wanted to hit John with a stick. Yes it's right because John was selfish to
blast his music. (boy,8yrs)
John deserves a hidingfrom Themba because he is been selfish for playing loud
music. (boy, 7yrs)
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For a moral judgment to be coded as operating from the justice orientation, statements
had to include one or more of the following ideas: violation ofa person's rights, violation
of standards of behaviour, violation of a principle, violation of fairness, and violation of
the "Golden Rule" doing something to others that one would not want done to oneself.
Table 4: Number of Justice Operant Concepts by Age Range and Gender
Gender Justice Orientation
Justice Operant Concepts Age
Male Female Male Female Total
Violation of a person's rights. 6 n=8 n=9 6 (50%) 6 (50%) 12
7 n=13 n =13 4 (40%) 6 (60%) 10
8 n = 12 n= 12 1 (33%) 2 (67%) 3
Total 11 (44%) 14(56%) 25
Violation of standards of 6 n=8 n=9 5 (50%) 5 (50%) 10
behaviour. 7 n =13 n =13 7 (50%) 7 (50%) 14
8 n =12 n=12 10 (56%) 8 (44%) 18
Total 22 (52%) 20 (48%) 42
Violation of a principle. 6 n=8 n=9 6 (40%) 9 (60%) 15
7 n=13 n =13 21 (64%) 12 (36%) 33
8 n =12 n =12 17 (49%) 18(51%) 35
Total 44 (53%) 39 (47%) 83
Violation of fairness 6 n=8 n=9 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 7
a) taking advantage of unequal 7 n=13 n=13 4 (67%) 2 (33%) 6
power. 8 n =12 n =12 9 (69%) 4 (31 %) 13
b) Undeserved punishment
Total 17 (65%) 9 (35%) 26
Violation of the "Golden Rule" 6 n=8 n=9 5 (63%) 3 (38%) 8
doing something to others that 7 n=13 n =13 6 (46%) 7 (54%) 13
one would not want done to 8 n =12 n=12 3 (75%0 1 (25%) 4
oneself.
Total 14 (56%) 11 (44%) 25
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Justice as a moral orientation has violation of a principle as its moral objective. Overall,
across age boys' most frequent explanations given for justice reasoning involved
violation of a principle. 53% of the responses given by boys reflected violation of a
principle.
Brandon said he was going to give Peter the money and he didn't. (boy, 6yrs)
Brandon promise to give Peter back the money. (boy, 7yrs)
Brandon did not give the money back and that's stealing and Peter wanted to hit
Brandon for not giving the money. (boy, 8yrs)
Overall, across age 47% of girls most frequent explanation given for justice reasoning
involved violation of a principle.
No, because you need to pay people back ifyou owe them money. (girl, 7yrs)
It is not right to borrow money from people to go and buy chips and not give them
the money back. (girl, 7yrs)
No, it's not right to borrow money and not return it. (girl, 8yrs)
Sometimes breaking a rule or sets of rules or a principle or law was what was seen as
precipitating the violent event, and the violating action was what the learner considered in
judging who was right or wrong or responsible for the violence.
A focus on standards of behaviour was the second most frequently cited concern of the
learners whose interviews were coded as justice. Overall, across age and gender 52% of
the boys' and 48% of the girls' responses reflected violation of standards of behaviour.
The learners suggested that if people step outside the boundaries of acceptable standards
of behaviour, violence erupts.
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Brandon should not have borrowed money from Peter because borrowing money
is not good. (Girl, 8yrs)
Themba hit John with a stick. No it's not good to behave in such a way. (Boy,8yrs)
She was wrong to have pushed Rita down the stairs. (Girl, 6yrs)
Some explanations given for justice reasoning involved using violence as a violation of a
person's rights. 56% of the girls' and 44% of the boys' across age differences based their
responses reflecting violation of person's rights.
Violation of fairness either taking advantage of unequal power and undeserved
punishment where some of the explanations given for justice reasoning. Fairness and
equity, the essence of the justice perspective, form the basis for justification. It was
interesting to note that 65% of the boys across ages made responses that reflected a
violation of fairness compared to 35% of the girls across ages. This is in line with
Gilligan's (1982) view.
4.3 Conclusion
The findings in this study revealed that, contrary to Kohlberg's view, across age and
gender the learners' responses reflected a higher moral orientation to care than justice.
70% of the learners' responses reflected a care orientation compared to 30% that
reflected ajustice orientation. An interesting finding was that across age boys' responses
reflected a more care orientation (68%) than ajustice orientation (32%). A similar pattern
was evident with girls across the age ranges: 72% of girls' responses were caring oriented
as against to 28% that were justice oriented. In fact, children are more likely to choose
the care perspective because early in development, both boys and girls appear to
understand the importance of solving problems in a way that considers the needs and
concerns of all participants. In the care operant concept 51 % of the girls' responses
reflected a greater attention to hurt, pain, or suffering compared to 49% of the boys.
Whilst 53% of boys' most frequent explanations given for justice reasoning involved
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violation of a principle compared to 47% of girls. This is in line with Gilligan's (1982)
VIew.
Views on the social construction of childhood as outlined by James and Prout (1997)
suggest that there is a shift away from an emphasis on structure to that of agency where
children are recognised as children in their own rights. Children are fully formed and
complete individuals with perspectives of their own. They are autonmous subjects and
they are recognised as having rights of their own, including the right to protection from
harm and the right to voice opinions and influence decisions in matters relating to their
own lives. Children are active in the construction and determination of their own lives.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to find out whether boys and girls used both justice and care
orientations and anyone orientation to solve real life moral dilemmas depending on the
context of the dilemma. The purpose of the research was to determine whether there were
age and gender differences in the moral reasoning of young children.
The distinctive feature of this study is the use of real life rather than hypothetical
dilemmas. The scenarios were standardized rather than the children providing their own
experiences of violence for analysis. There are, however, good reasons for examing the
ways in which more "everyday" judgements are made. Not only was it important to learn
something more of the social and cultural context in which moral thought is embedded in
children within a South African context but it was also crucial to explore moral decision-
making in real life.
Gilligan and her colleagues (Gilligan, 1982; Lyons, 1983; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988;
Gilligan et al., 1988, 1990) have suggested that hypothetical problems such as the Heinz
dilemma tend to elicit rights-orientated reasoning, and that the care orientation is best
observed in responses to the real life moral dilemma. The participants in this study were
given real-life dilemma tasks, which allowed for the expression ofreasoning that reflects
the moral orientation of concern for others as well as the self, and the goal of preserving
important relationships.
Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas were an integral component of his interview method,
and offered high inter-rater reliability in use of the research instrument. Gilligan claimed
that theses hypothetical dilemmas presupposed a definition of morality as justice and
were biased towards justice-based resolutions. In contrast, Gilligan used open-ended
interview questions about real life dilemmas. In this study real life dilemmas were
developed taking into account the context of the lives of the participants. The children in
this study live in a context where families are exposed to many social hardships and are
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deprived of simple basic needs. By describing an experienced moral dilemma, the
participants were able to define morality in the context of their own lives.
Embedded in children's understandings of violence can be identified concepts ofjustice
and care as moral orientations, in line with the view of Gilligan (1982). The findings did
corroborate fully with Gilligan's theory of moral orientation. The results revealed that
children across gender and age made more care than justice based responses. 70% of the
learners' responses reflected a care orientation compared to 30% that reflected ajustice
orientation. In this study, boys were more care oriented than justice oriented in their
responses to the dilemmas. The children choose solutions embodying the care perspective
as the best way to solve real-life dilemmas.
This study also examined moral operant concepts. Learners were found to use moral
language in their explanations and justifications of violence and they made thoughtful
judgements about those who participated in the real-life dilemmas. Thus it was necessary
to create an expanded analytical framework with coding categories for justice and for
care. This approach allowed the researcher to see the strengths as well as the limitations
inherent in the thinking of the learners. Both justice and care thinking provided a
foundation upon which educators can build as they attempt to nurture and sustain moral
reflectiveness and responsibility (Ward, 1988). In the care operant concepts, the learners'
combined responses reflected a greater attention to hurt, pain, or suffering (both physical
and psychological) across gender and age. 51 % of the girls' responses reflected attention
to hurt, pain, or suffering as a care orientation compared to 49% of the boys. In the justice
operant concepts, 53% of boys' most frequent explanations given for justice reasoning
involved violation of a principle compared to 47% of girls. The findings of this study do
corroborate fully to Gilligan's theory of moral orientation.
In the final analysis, the research highlighted that although the children who have been
exposed to violence and situations where their rights may have been restricted unfairly
still exhibited a care orientation. Their concern for moral solutions expressing issues of
care, responsibility, dependency, loyalty, concern that individuals may get hurt, and be
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harmed, experience pain, or experience psychological or physical suffering. However,
further research is needed with a larger sample to confirm and clarify the trends in this
study. There could possibly be a comparative study between foundation and the
intermediate phase learners across age and gender.
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Appendix 1: Letter of consent to parents
Faculty of Education
University of KwaZulu - Natal
Durban
To whom it may concern
This letter serves to confirm that I, Ms D. Govender an educator at Woodlands Primary
School is currently registered as aM. Ed (psychology) student in the School of
Education, Training and Development, University of Kwazulu - Natal.
As a requirement for this degree, I will be conducting research with a group of foundation
phase learners at Woodlands Primary School. The research examines how children reason
about conflicts they experience. The children will be told simple stories and then asked to
make judgements about why people behave in certain ways.
I will be grateful if you will give permission for your child _
in grade to participate in this research. The information the children provide will
be confidential and pseudonyms will be used to protect the identity of the child.
Your permission will be gratefully appreciated.
Yours sincerely
D. Govender (Ms)
Contact no: (033) 3871005
Supervisor: Prof. A Muthukrishna
School of Education and Development
Tel & Fax: 033 - 2606045
033 - 2605080
Email: muthukri@ukzn.ac.za
1. (full names of
parent) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of
the research project, and I consent to my child participating in the research project.
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw my child from the project at any time, should










Lencwadi iyakwazisa ukuthi mina uMs D Govender ngifunda eNyuvesi yase-KZN.
Ngizobe ngisebenza ngbantwana balapha eWoodlands Primary School njengeuxenye
yocwaningo Iwami. Locucwaningo lulalungana nezinkinga abantwana abancane
abalhangabezane nazo nabanye abantwana. Locucccwaninbgo luyobe lutshela
abantwana izindaba ezimayelane nezingane ebese abantwana bebuza imibuzo emumva
kwaleyo naleyondaba. Ngiyothokaza-ke mzali uma ungivumela ekuba ngisebenze
nomntwana.






Supervisor: Prof. A Muthukrishna
School of Education and Development
Tel & Fax: 033 - 2606045
033 - 2605080
Email: muthukri@ukzn.ac.za
Mina --------------------------------------------- [igama lomzali ngokugcwele]
Ngiyafakaze ukuthi ngiyakuzwa konke lokhu okukulenewadi futhi ngiyavuma ukuba
umntwana wami abuzwi imibuzo emayelanma nalolucwaningo.
Ngiyazi nokho ukuthi nginelungelo lokumumisa umntwana warni kulolucwaningo uma
ngifisa ukumumisa, noma-nje uma yena uqobo umntwana engasathandi ukuqhubeka
naluolucwaningo uvunyelwe ukuba azimise.
Ukusayina komzali ------------------------ Usuku -------------------------
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Dear Mr D. F Alexander
This letter serves to confirm that I, Ms D. Govender an educator at Woodlands Primary
School am currently registered, as a M. Ed (psychology) student in the School of
Education, Training and Development, University of Kwazulu- Natal.
As a requirement for this degree, I will be conducting research with a group of foundation
phase learners at Woodlands Primary School. The research examines how children reason
about conflicts they experience. The children will be told simple stories and then asked to
make judgements about why people behave in certain ways.
I, therefore kindly request permission to conduct my research at your school. Should you




Home no: (031) 4098961
Cell 0732400612
Supervisor: Prof. A .Muthukrishna
School of Education and Development

















INHLOKOHHOVISI PIETERMARITZBURG HEAD OFFICE
Appendix 4: Letter from the Department of Education.
RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Date:
Usuku: 27 February 2006
Datum:
This is to serve as a notice that Ms D. Govender has been granted permission to conduct
research with the following terms and conditions:
~ That as a researcher, he/she must present a copy of the written permission from the
Department to the Head of the Institution concerned before any research may be undertaken at a
departmental institution.
~ Attached is the list of schools she/he has been granted permission to conduct research in.
however, it must be noted that the schools are not obligated to participate in the research if it is
not a KZNDoE project.
~ Ms D. Govender has been granted special permission to conduct his/her research during
official contact times, as it is believed that their presence would not interrupt education
programmes. Should education programmes be interrupted, he/she must, therefore, conduct
his/her research during nonofficial contact times.
~ No school is expected to participate in the research during the fourth school term, as this
is the critical period for schools to focus on their exams.
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Usuku: 27 February 2006
Datum:
I,..ist of Schools where Research will be conducted:
1) Woodlands Primary School
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